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Non--Technical Summary
Good policy advice, in addition to requiring sound theoretical frameworks to identify growth-enhancing fiscal reforms, also needs a reliable evidence base. Much of this evidence base has tradi-tionally come from applications of econometric methods to various fiscal aggregates. However, con-cerns have recently been raised over the merits of this type of evidence for policy reform advice in practice; see, for example, Rodrik (2005) , Hausmann et al. (2008a) . It seems therefore useful to ques-tion whether business perception data included for instance in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) are a useful additional source of information to guide policy makers' choices. These surveys contain ratings of various factors regarded as 'obstacles' or 'constraints' on firms' growth perfor-mance as identified by firm owners or managers. With firms' investment decisions likely to be an important driver of aggregate economic growth, and these investment decisions likely to be affected by firms' perceptions, such perception indicators could potentially be a valuable source of infor-mation on actual growth constraints. Indeed, a number of authors have recently argued over the merits of such business survey information as a reliable identifier of actual constraints, and the policy reforms that might follow.
The objective of this paper is to examine whether, and when, subjective perceptions of firms may be a useful source of information to help identify growth--enhancing fiscal reforms. Specifically, adopting the standard theoretical framework for the analysis of fiscal policy and long--run growth, we demon-strate that firms' perceptions can be expected to suffer from particular biases. We show that while these biases can be expected to be important for some fiscal policy reform options, they are not for others. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between the specific contexts in which such business perception information is likely to offer reliable or unreliable guidance to growth--enhancing policy reforms. The essence of our argument is that, in part because of the way business survey ques-tions are constructed, firms' responses can be expected to focus on the direct effects of policies alle-viating particular constraints that they see as obstacles, while ignoring the externalities, or indirect effects of these policies. We exploit this assumption to model firm perceptions of fiscal policy--related constraints including taxation and public expenditures taking two different forms: flows of public services and stocks of public capital.
The paper makes two contributions. The first is to evaluate, based on a class of endogenous growth models, whether business perception data could be useful in identifying the optimal direction for fiscal policy reform. We show that, regardless of model parameters, it is likely that firms perceive the (distortionary) tax rate as a more severe constraint than public service--related constraints, which in turn are likely to be perceived as more severe than public capital--related constraints. Firms view fis-cal constraints in this order even when taxes and spending are set at their optimal, growth-maximizing values (i.e. where changes to any fiscal parameters would result in declines of the growth rate). However, this framework also predicts that for comparisons of fiscal constraints involving simi-lar types of public spending (e.g. between two public service--related, or two public capital--related, spending categories), business perception data do not suffer from such systematic biases vis--à--vis optimal policy responses.
The second contribution is to compare actual business perception data from the World Bank Enter-prise Surveys, and in particular how firms rank fiscal policy--related constraints, with the ranking pre-dicted by the endogenous fiscal--growth framework. We find that the WBES rankings of fiscal policy-related constraints closely match those predicted by the theoretical models.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Politikempfehlungen zur Förderung von Wirtschaftswachstum basieren idealerweise auf theoreti-schen Modellen und auf empirischer Evidenz. Letztere ist traditionell das Ergebnis statistischer Aus-wertungen von aggregierten fiskalpolitischen Daten mittels Regressionen. In der Literatur werden Politikempfehlungen, die auf dieser Art von empirischer Evidenz basieren, allerdings zunehmend kritisiert, siehe z.B. Rodrik (2005) 
Introduction
The seminal contributions of Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) provided the foundation for what has become a 'standard'theoretical framework to analyze the impact of …scal policy on long-run growth. Broadly, this involves modelling the distortionary e¤ects of taxation via impacts on the private marginal product of capital, and the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of di¤erent types of public spending. 1 Such models capture …scal externalities in the form of private …rm-level productivity e¤ects from public spending and the deadweight costs of taxation. While such frameworks are helpful for thinking at a fairly high level about potential growth e¤ects of …scal policy, in practice, they provide only limited guidance to policy advisers seeking to identify which particular …scal reforms (changes in individual tax rates or changes to speci…c categories of public spending for example) are likely to be growth-enhancing or have the smallest/largest impact. Recently a related but largely separate strand of research has begun to focus on speci…c policy-based and other constraints on growth; see, for example, Dixit (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2008b) and Rodrik (2010) . This conceptual 'growth diagnostic'approach focuses on identifying the most binding constraints on growth in practice and thereby goes beyond the more abstract predictions and policy implications of highly stylized conceptual models. 2 However, good policy advice, in addition to requiring sound theoretical frameworks to identify growth-enhancing …scal reforms, also needs a reliable evidence base. The objective of this paper is therefore to examine whether, and when, subjective perceptions of …rms may be a useful source of information to help identify growth-enhancing …scal reforms.
Much of the evidence base for policy advice to promote growth has traditionally come from applications of econometric methods to various …scal aggregates. However, concerns have recently been raised over the merits of this type of evidence for policy reform advice in practice; see, for example, perceptions, such perception indicators could potentially be a valuable source of information on actual growth constraints. Recognizing the potential value of these data does not imply however that we would want to take a view that these data always provide 'useful' information to policy makers, although equally we do not want to take the view that they should never be used.
This type of 'balanced'view must be based on a framework through which to interpret these data. Indeed, a number of authors have recently argued over the merits of such business survey information as a reliable identi…er of actual constraints, and the policy reforms that might follow. 3 Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2009) …nd that the ratings of a range of obstacles by …rms correlate positively with objective measures of the same constraint; by contrast, Clarke (2010) …nds that the rating of speci…c obstacles is a¤ected by the managers'overall business con…dence undermining the potential value for policy of business perceptions. Based on a static model where production requires private and public inputs, Carlin et al. (2007 Carlin et al. ( , 2010 mainly examine the ratings of the same constraint by di¤erent …rms in di¤erent countries and show that ratings of public good-related obstacles are negatively correlated with country-level income and positively correlated with …rm-level performance. By contrast, we take a di¤erent approach and adopt the standard theoretical framework for the analysis of …scal policy and long-run growth of both the aggregate economy and a representative …rm dating back to Barro (1990) and demonstrate that …rms' perceptions, in particular the ranking of di¤erent …scal policy-related constraints by the same …rm, can be expected to su¤er from particular biases. While this framework is based on a restrictive set of assumptions, we nevertheless argue that it is particularly well suited to model and assess …rms'perceptions of growth constraints, in part due to its simplicity and the resulting clarity of the analysis. We show that these biases can be expected to be important for the evaluation of some …scal policy reform options, but not for others. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between the speci…c contexts in which such business perception information is likely to o¤er reliable or unreliable guidance to growth-enhancing policy reforms.
The essence of our argument is that, in part because of the way business survey questions are constructed, …rms'responses can be expected to focus on the direct e¤ects of policies alleviating particular constraints that they see as obstacles, while ignoring the externalities, or indirect e¤ects of these policies. Endogenous growth models with public …nance involve a direct theoretical counterpart to this: private agents ignore the externalities that arise via the government budget constraint. For instance, they ignore positive externalities from private investment in the sense that increasing output raises public revenue which in turn gives rise to higher productive public spending. We exploit this assumption to model …rm perceptions of …scal policy-related constraints including taxation and public expenditures taking two di¤erent forms: ‡ows of public services and stocks of public capital.
The paper makes two contributions. The …rst is to evaluate, based on a class of endogenous growth models, whether business perception data could be useful in identifying the optimal direction for …scal policy reform. We show that it is likely that …rms perceive the (distortionary) tax rate as a more severe constraint than public service-related constraints, which in turn are likely to be perceived as more severe than public capital-related constraints.
Firms view …scal constraints in this order even when taxes and spending are set at their optimal, growth-maximizing values (i.e., where changes to any …scal parameters would result in declines of the growth rate). However, this framework also predicts that for comparisons of …scal constraints involving similar types of public spending (between two public service-related, or two public capital-related, spending categories for example), business perception data do not su¤er from such systematic biases vis-à-vis optimal policy responses. Therefore, the perceived ranking of constraints may or may not be correlated with the actual severity of constraints. We show that our conclusions hold for a variety of model parameters such as those that determine the …rms'reliance on public services and public capital; we thereby take into account that …rms are heterogenous.
The second contribution is to compare actual business perception data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, and in particular how …rms rank …scal policy-related constraints, with the ranking predicted by the endogenous …scal-growth framework. The WBES, covering a wide range of businesses in many countries, provides comprehensive information on how …rms rate alternative …scal instruments in terms of the severity of the constraints imposed on their (growth) performance. We …nd that the WBES rankings of …scal policy-related constraints closely match those predicted by the theoretical models and therefore appear to mirror these biases. While based on the data we cannot rule out that the observed WBES ranking may in fact re ‡ect the actual severity of constraints, we nevertheless argue that in the absence of the biases we identify in the model, such an average ranking would be unlikely to arise across a large number of …rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 develop the models, derive the equilibrium of the market economy, and identify the …rst-best growth-maximizing policies. Section 4 models business perceptions, assesses their merits for policy making, and derives theoretical predictions regarding …rms'ranking of …scal policy-related constraints. Section 5 tests the latter against the ranking of constraints by …rms in the WBES. Section 6 concludes.
The Modelling Framework
The public …nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is an extension of the well known model developed by Devarajan et al. (1996) . We assume that there is a large number of in…nitely lived households and a large number of …rms that are both normalized to one, that population growth is zero, and that there is no entry or exit of …rms.
Given that we are not analyzing interactions between …rms and focus on the ranking of di¤erent constraints by the same …rm in subsequent sections, we only consider a single representative …rm. However, by considering the robustness of the results under a variety of technology parameters, we account for the fact that …rms are heterogeneous. The representative …rm produces a single composite good using private capital (k) which is broadly de…ned to encompass physical and human capital, and two public inputs, G 1 and G 2 , based on Cobb-Douglas technology:
The productivity of private capital used by the individual …rm therefore positively depends on G 1 and G 2 which are provided free of charge by the government at the point of consumption. For instance, private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road network increases. 4 G 1 and G 2 are delivered via two di¤erent productive public spending categories, g 1 and g 2 , and the government …nances total public expenditure, g 1 + g 2 , by levying a ‡at tax, , on income. Thus the government budget, which is assumed always to be balanced, is:
Let 1 and 2 denote the share of the budget that is allocated to g 1 and g 2 so that
with 1 + 2 = 1. 4 Obviously, most public services and types of public capital are subject to congestion which reduces the amount available to the individual …rm. Given that modelling congestion complicates the analysis considerably and may prevent long-run growth from arising, we implicitly assume for simplicity, that G 1 and G 2 are non-rival and non-excludable. However, our results would continue to hold with some congestion e¤ects.
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The households own the …rms and therefore receive all their output net of taxation which they either reinvest in the …rms to increase their capital stock or which they use for consumption depending on their preferences and the returns on private capital. 5 Investment by the representative household can therefore be written as
The instantaneous utility function of the household is
We develop three versions of the model to understand the robustness of the key result of the ranking of various …scal policy constraints. These accord with di¤erent views about whether the productive public inputs (G 1 and G 2 ) are stocks or ‡ows. In particular, there has been some debate in the literature regarding whether private output is likely to be a¤ected by the ‡ow of public services (miles of highway constructed per year for example) or the stock of public capital (total miles of highway in existence). 6 In Model 1, which coincides with the Devarajan et a. (1996) model,
implying that G 1 and G 2 are two di¤erent productive public services which are derived from the ‡ow of public expenditure.
In the second version of the model referred to as Model 2, G 1 denotes public services as above so that
whereas G 2 denotes the stock of public capital implying that g 2 represents public investment: This version corresponds to the model developed in Tsoukis and Miller (2003) for example.
In the third version of the model referred to as Model 3, G 1 and G 2 represent two di¤erent types of public capital so that
As shown below, all results derived for Model 1 equally apply to Model 3. Table 1 includes a summary of the key features of the models described above.
Alternatively, we could develop one model with two types of public services and two types of public capital that would allow us to gain exactly the same insights compared to the use of three models. However, while this model would be more realistic, the presentation would be also harder to follow, and there would be no immediate bene…ts.
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology is convenient because it allows for closed-form solutions of optimal policies as shown below, but arguably, it may not be very realistic. In particular, factors of production may be complements, in part because public inputs provided by the government fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such that it may be very costly for …rms to substitute for them. For example, poor performance of public law enforcement may require …rms to install costly security and property protection systems. Therefore, in the Appendix, we show that the results also hold for the more general case of CES technology when the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility U given by
subject to the respective production function of the model as well as the household's resource constraint given by (5) taking the initial capital stock k 0 > 0 as well as , G 1 and G 2 as given. 7 The latter assumption, namely that private agents take all aspects of …scal policy as given, is crucial for the remainder of the paper and directly follows from the fact that the model economy is populated by a large number of …rms and households. From the …rst-order conditions, the growth rate of the household's consumption and of the economy can be written in familiar form as
The representative household computes the marginal product of private capital (which represents the returns on private capital) from (1) while holding constant the quantity of public inputs to private production that the representative …rm it owns receives. Here we are assuming that when there are a large number of tax-paying …rms, the impact of raising the stock of the private capital and output of an individual …rm on the level of total public spending is likely very small and can therefore safely be ignored. Hence, the marginal product of private capital is
so that from (12), the growth rate can be written as
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not constrain the choice of and 1;2 , it is assumed that > 1. 8 In Model 1, there are no transitional dynamics, and the economy is always on the balanced growth path. The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of Models 2 and 3 is saddlepoint stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced growth path is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G 1 , G 2 and y all grow at the same rate. Obviously, in this class of models, long-run growth 7 The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its derivative with respect to time. In Models 2 and 3, the initial stock of public capital must also be greater than zero. 8 The transversality condition can be written as lim t!1
[ k] = 0 where is the costate variable of the current-value Hamiltonian.
at the aggregate level is a result of the nature of the …rms'production function: the …rms'output grows in the long-run due to constant returns to scale in private capital and public inputs which expand in parallel to the …rms' capital stock. The growth rate of the representative …rm, _ y y , in turn corresponds to (12) and depends on the net return to private capital, (1 )y k , and on the owner's (i.e. the households') preferences represented by and .
Optimal Fiscal Policy
This section derives the growth-maximizing tax rate, , and the growthmaximizing share of public resources allocated to each public input to private production (G 1;2 ), 1;2 . These growth-maximizing policies provide the benchmark against which business perceptions of policy are then compared below. For simplicity, we assume that the objective of the government is to maximize growth. We recognize that growth-and welfare-maximizing policies may di¤er in these models, although di¤erences in outcomes are often relatively small as shown by Misch et al. (forthcoming) . Firms only consider growth outcomes; for that reason we leave the consideration of welfare maximization to future analysis. In order to …nd the growth-maximizing policies,
k must be expressed in terms of the …scal policy parameters in each model version.
Model 1 (two public services)
Using (7) to substitute for G 1;2 in (1) and rearranging yields
so that G 1 k and G 2 k can be written as
Using (16) and (17), the growth rate given by (14) can be re-written as
Maximizing (18) with regard to and 1 and taking into account that 2 = 1 1 yields the growth-maximizing tax rate, , the growth-maximizing share of public resources allocated to G 1 , 1 , and the growth-maximizing share of public resources allocated to G 2 , (1 1 ):
Model 2 (public services and public capital stock)
Using the condition along the balanced growth path:
to substitute for y in (9), and integrating, yields
Further, using (8) and (23) to substitute for G 1 and G 2 , respectively, in (1), and rearranging yields:
Finally, using (24), (22) , and (23) in combination with (14), it can then be shown that the growth rate in Model 2 has to satisfy the following equation:
which di¤ers from Model 1 because appears on the RHS. However, using implicit di¤erentiation, it can be shown that the growth-maximizing tax rate and the growth-maximizing spending share of G 1 , and 1 , respectively, are identical to Model 1 when Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed.
Model 3 (two public capital stocks)
In Model 3, G 1 and G 2 denote the stock of two di¤erent types of public capital and can be expressed by analogy to (23) as:
such that the growth rate satis…es the following equation:
The growth-maximizing policies can then be derived in a similar manner to Model 2. With Cobb-Douglas technology, they are also identical to Model 1.
In all models, and 1;2 can be considered as optimal policies in a situation where the government is unconstrained and maximizes growth. However, governments are typically constrained in their ability to change various elements of …scal policy due to legal requirements or commitments such as interest payments that depend on previous accumulated public debt, which generate 'budget rigidities'. More importantly, governments are inevitably imperfectly informed about the production technology parameters required to set and 1;2 to their …rst-best values. Rather, governments generally face the challenge of identifying growth-enhancing policy changes or reforms that take existing policy as its starting point. The next section considers how far business (…rms') assessments of …scal policy-related constraints to growth can be expected to serve as a reliable guide to identify the direction of …scal policy parameter changes that enhance growth. …rms in the Enterprise Surveys. This will allow us to assess whether the …scal policy adjustments they suggest raise or lower the long-run growth rate and thereby align with the …rst-best policy option chosen by a perfectly informed government that maximizes the growth rate. As part of the Enterprise Surveys, business owners or top managers are typically asked: "Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation and growth of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity as an obstacle on a four-point scale". 9 The list of obstacles that …rms are presented includes tax rates, various types of obstacles that relate to publicly provided services and one obstacle that relates to public capital.
We model the …rms'perceptions of these types of constraints, namely the tax rate, public services and public capital, as equivalent to the …rms'expectations about the impact of relaxing constraints on their growth rate. In our model, these constraints correspond to , and G 1 as well as G 2 , which, depending on the model version, either represent public services and/or public capital. Note that these constraints are not equivalent to the policy parameters that the government can set, namely , 1 and 2 .
The business perceptions of the severity of these constraints are potentially biased if the central assumption we make holds, namely that business respondents do not internalize the government budget constraint when they are asked to rate …scal policy-related constraints. This assumption follows directly from the positive investment externality described above and thereby ensures consistency because …rms are also assumed to ignore these externalities when they 'compute'the returns on their investment. This assumption is further justi…ed in the presence of a large number of …rms: individual …rms are unlikely to internalize the positive externalities of private investment, where the latter arise because higher levels of private output result in higher public revenue, which in turn enables higher levels of productive public spending and thereby higher returns to all …rms'private capital. Finally, since the way the survey question is framed makes no provision for the existence or the relevance of the government budget constraint, it might be expected to encourage …rms to ignore the government budget constraint in the context of the survey. 10 The rating of the severity of obstacles implies that …rms take the public inputs to private production, G 1 and G 2 , as given. While …rms could in principle rate the severity of the constraints in terms of increases in current output, lifetime utility, or the growth rate, that result from their alleviation, we choose the latter as this is the measure implied by the question asked in the Enterprise Surveys. 11 A natural way to model the answers of the …rms in the Enterprise Surveys is therefore to consider the growth e¤ects of relaxing the constraints. We model this as the change in the growth rate that the representative …rm expects as a result of raising G 1 and G 2 and lowering .
We therefore use the derivatives of the growth rate with respect to G 1 , G 2 and (denoted by B 1 , B 2 , and B , respectively) as simple measures of the …rms'rating of the severity of the constraints; hence: 12
where, based on our assumptions, …rms perceive the growth rate, B , as:
which corresponds to (14) . 10 Though this assumption seems reasonable in the context of responses to business surveys questions, the political economy literature assessing individuals' or voters' …scal policy preferences has egun to examine the case where they recognize the government budget constraint; see, for example, Creedy (2008). 11 The di¤erent measures can yield di¤erent results, especially where the models imply that growth-and welfare-maximizing policies di¤er. In Model 1, for example, the growthand welfare-maximizing …scal policies coincide under Cobb-Douglas technology because public capital is not included (see Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) for comparison). 12 When we compute the partial derivatives, we implicitely ignore the subsequent change in the capital stock that is a consequence of the second-order response to a change in the change of the capital stock (i.e. a change in the rate of investment). These e¤ects are likely to be small and qualitatively unimportant for our results.
Assessing Business Perceptions
Business perceptions of constraints can be assessed by evaluating the preferred …scal policies they imply. If, for instance, B 1 > 0, then business perceptions imply that increasing 1 or , in order to raise G 1 , has a positive e¤ect on the growth rate. Note that B is de…ned above as the negative of @ B @ , such that if B > 0, businesses perceive that lowering has a positive e¤ect on the growth rate. Clearly then, business perceptions will suggest the direction of the appropriate policy response, but will not indicate the magnitude of the change necessary to reach the growth-maximizing point. While this is a limitation of the information that can be gained from business perception data compared to that found from calculating where the growthmaximizing point lies, in practice, budget rigidities and other information limitations often mean that …scal policy adjustments require recognizing the correct direction, rather than end-point, of reform.
When all …scal policy parameters are set at their growth-maximizing levels then, in the absence of any systematic bias, …rms should perceive none of the constraints as binding, that is: B 1;2 = 0 and B = 0. However, it is obvious from equation (30) that …rms always perceive that B 1;2 > 0 and B > 0 so that the policy suggestions arising from business perceptions may con ‡ict with 'correct'…rst-best policy advice. Other things equal, …rms always want more spending on productive public inputs and lower taxation. 13 The 'true' e¤ects of changing 1;2 or obviously depend on whether their current values are at, below, or above their growth-maximizing values, 1;2 and . The source of this systematic bias of business perceptions relates to our assumption that …rms ignore the government budget constraint: …rms do not consider the negative e¤ects (positive e¤ects) of lowering taxes in terms of lower productive public spending (or increasing spending on public services and public capital in terms of higher taxation). From the models, this is not surprising, given that the expression for the perceived growth rate (30) di¤ers from the growth rates in the three models considered as 13 The only exception is of course the unrealisitc case when = 0 so that = 0 or when G 1 and G 2 are so large so that B assessed by a perfectly informed government -in (18) , (25) and (27) . By contrast, a fully informed government essentially assesses the severity of constraints associated with …scal policy by computing the …rst derivatives of (18), (25) and (27), depending on the model, with respect to , 1 and 2 . Where policy parameters are already set at their growth-maximizing levels, a fully informed government would not perceive them as binding, so that @ =@ 1;2 = @ =@ = 0.
Comparing the optimal, i.e. …rst-best policy choices, with those suggested by business perceptions is in essence an analogy to comparisons between investment decisions taken by a central planner and by private agents in a decentralized economy. In both cases, di¤erences arise because of positive investment externalities that are ignored by private agents: private investment raises the stock of private capital resulting in higher output and therefore higher public revenue. Given that the government budget is always assumed to be balanced, increased public revenue leads to higher levels of productive public expenditure which in turn increases private productivity. Ignoring this externality obviously distorts private investment.
We now attempt to correct business perceptions for this bias: instead of considering business perceptions in absolute terms, the policy implications of business perceptions are instead evaluated in relative terms; i.e. we compare perceptions of di¤erent obstacles, by the same …rm. If constraint i is perceived as more binding than constraint j (so that B i B j > 1 with i; j = 1; 2; and i 6 = j), the policy implication is that removing constraint i raises the growth rate whereas alleviating constraint j enhances the growth rate less or may even lower the growth rate. The underlying rationale is that this may 'cancel out'the systematic bias due to ignoring the government budget constraint inherent in the perception of all obstacles. In particular, ignoring the government budget constraint essentially implies that …rms ignore the indirect e¤ects of alleviating …scal policy constraints. In principle, if the indirect e¤ects are approximately similar or are alternatively negatively correlated with the direct growth e¤ects that result from alleviating constraints and that …rms perceive (so that the observed direct e¤ects are su¢ cient to determine the ranking of the constraints), this is a useful strategy. However, we show in subsequent sub-sections that while our strategy to correct for the bias of business perceptions proves successful for similar types of constraints, some systematic bias may remain when di¤erent types of constraints are compared.
Firms' Comparisons of Di¤erent Types of Public Services or of Public Capital
We …rst turn to 'successful' cases and evaluate the policy implications of business perceptions of similar public spending-related constraints in relation to each other in Model 1 (two di¤erent public services) and in Model 3 (two di¤erent types of public capital). From (28),
can be written as
A comparison of the perceptions of two types public services or two types of public capital eliminates the potential bias inherent in subjective …rm data due to the …rms ignoring the government budget constraint. To show this, we use (7) for the case of two public services (Model 1) and (26) for the case of two types of public capital (Model 2) to re-write (31) as
For the case where spending shares are set at the growth maximum ( 1 = 1 ), it can be shown that:
That is, …rms perceive both constraints as equally binding when the allocation is growth-maximizing in Models 1 and 3. If, on the other hand, 1 < 1 ,
> 1 which suggests that G 1 is a greater constraint than G 2 (or vice versa). The conclusion from business perceptions would be to increase 1 which is obviously growth-enhancing, irrespective of the parameter values of the model. In this case, …rm perceptions always align with that which would be suggested by a fully-informed government and therefore business perceptions are of value in this regard and the perceived ranking is correlated with the actual ranking of growth constraints. Here, the strategy to eliminate the bias inherent in business perceptions by considering them in relative terms is hence successful. This analysis also shows that
is determined by actual public spending allocation so that no general predictions regarding the probability that any of the constraints is perceived as more binding than the remaining one can be made. 14 
Firms'Comparisons of Public Services and Public Capital
This sub-section evaluates the policy implications of business perceptions of the public spending-related constraints in relation to each other in Model 2 (one public service and one type of public capital). In this case, comparing the perceptions of both types of constraints fails to correct the bias in business perceptions. The intuition is that public capital is accumulated over time and grows even in the absence of …scal policy adjustments. By ignoring the government budget constraint, …rms do not take into account these di¤erences.
To show this formally, we substitute for G 1 and G 2 in (31) using (7) and (26):
That is, compared to (32), in Model 2 is added to the denominator of (34). In this model there is no closed-form solution of , so that (34) cannot be evaluated analytically. However, using numerical examples, it can be shown that in most instances, the policy preferences arising from business perceptions in this case can be expected to be growth-reducing. Suppose for instance 1 = 2 and 1 = 1 = 0:5: Given that < 1, it can be seen that in this case,
This falsely suggests that the government should increase rise to the same result.
Using numerical examples, it is also possible to assess the probability that …rms perceive public services as a greater constraint than public capital and vice versa by determining where in the …scal policy space 1 2 > 1. The …scal policy space is de…ned in terms of all possible combinations of both …scal policy parameters, and , within certain ranges. Figure 1 displays > 1 which has been approximated numerically for each …gure. 15 In all cases, P ( 1 2 > 1) (i.e. the probability that …rms perceive public service-related constraints as more severe than public capital-related constraints) is relatively high and signi…cantly greater than 0.5. This holds even though the output elasticity of public capital, 2 , is three times larger than the output elasticity of public services, 1 , in our simulation, but this may not hold as 2 .increases much further. 16 While these numerical simulations cannot be regarded as representative, they nevertheless demonstrate that in many cases, it can be expected that 1 2 > 1 except for relatively high values of 1 . Now suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
implying that …rms perceive G 2 (public capital) as more binding than G 1 15 The area where
> 1 can be approximated by using the Trapezoidal Rule with an interval length of 0:001 and then divided by the total area of the policy space. 16 These measures of probability should be considered as a lower bound because the location of the region where in the policy space (public service). From (34), this implies that
Rearranging (36) yields
In turn, if the RHS of (37) is larger than 1 so that
Again, assuming that 0 < < 1, then (38) is ful…lled.
In other words, when …rms perceive that G 2 (public capital) is a greater constraint than G 1 (public service), then the policy implications of business perceptions of the public service-related constraint in terms of the public capital-related constraint (namely to lower 1 ) are growth-enhancing. It follows that when public services are ranked as a more severe constraint to growth than public capital, then according to our model business perception data are not a reliable guide to policy, whereas if public capital is identi…ed as the more severe constraint they are.
Firms'Comparisons of Taxes and Public Spending-Related Constraints
This sub-section evaluates the policy implications of business perceptions of the tax-related constraint in terms of the public spending-related constraints.
From (28) In order to more rigorously evaluate the merits of this comparison, we substitute for G i using (7) according to which G i = i y:
Suppose that the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level ( = ), but that the public resource allocation is suboptimal such that i = 1 2 i . It is clear that in this case, raising i and keeping constant would be growth-enhancing. However, according to the business perception
This condition is likely to hold true within endogenous growth models regardless of the composition of public spending and the level of taxation because y (which constantly grows) is on the LHS. Therefore, the probability that tax rates are perceived as more binding than public spending-related constraints (P ( 1;2 > 1)) approaches one as time approaches in…nity irrespective of the units of measurement of y. As a result, it is uncertain that
provides the 'correct'(…rst-best) policy prescriptions. Business perceptions of the appropriate policy response, to lower taxation, may match the …rst-best policy prescription, but …rms support this policy response even when it is not optimal. Separating the occasions in which …rm perceptions are correct and when they are incorrect is not possible in this case; hence perception data are not a reliable guide to policy when B > B i . Given that comparing the tax-and the public services-related constraints to correct for the bias in business perceptions is not feasible due to di¤erences in measurement, an obvious alternative would be to use business perceptions to compute perceived growth elasticities with respect to and G i because elasticities are unit-free. Using (29), (28) , and (39) to compute the perceived growth elasticities and dividing yields
When the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level ( = ), (43) can be rewritten as
which is again greater than zero falsely suggesting that lowering taxation raises the growth rate. The bias therefore remains even in case when perceived elasticities are compared. This implies that the underlying source of the bias is therefore primarily related to …rms ignoring the government budget constraint which cannot be corrected by considering business perceptions relative to each other when the constraints are measured on di¤erent scales. Now again suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
22 Rearranging (46) yields
In turn, if the RHS of (47) is smaller than so that
then < . Provided that is not extremely small, (48) is likely to hold if
The reason is that the LHS of (48) is decreasing over time (since y which grows inde…nitely is in the denominator). (48) together with (47) then implies that < is likely. Rearranging (46) yields
Again, provided that i is not extremely small, the RHS of (49) is likely smaller than i since y, which grows over time, is in the denominator so that
In other words, the policy implications of B B i < 1 (i.e. …rms perceive that G i is a greater constraint than ) are likely to be growth-enhancing in most cases. If public services are ranked as a more severe constraint than taxation, the business perception of the appropriate policy response is identical to the one suggested by a perfectly informed government which maximizes growth. Business perception data contain therefore useful information when B < B i . All results presented here also hold for Models 2 and 3. Table 2 summarizes the assessment of business perceptions of di¤erent constraints in relative terms across all models and shows in which cases imperfectly informed governments may regard them as consistent with …rst-best advice. Perceptions-based rankings of similar types of constraints (i.e. di¤erent public services or di¤erent types of public capital) give growth-enhancing policy suggestions, whereas perceptions-based rankings of di¤erent types of constraints (tax-related constraints and public spending-related constraints, or public service-related constraints and public capital-related constraints) may give rise to growth-reducing policy suggestions depending on how …rms rank them.
Summary
The last column of Table 2 summarizes the key predictions regarding how …rms rank constraints. In summary, it is likely that …rms perceive the taxrelated constraint as more binding than public service-related constraints, which, in turn, are perceived as more binding than public capital-related constraints ( B > B ps > B pc ). Firms perceive the tax rate as a more severe constraint than public spending-related constraints because whereas public services and public capital enter the expression of the growth rate (14) as absolute values, the tax rate enters (14) as a relative value (i.e. from (2), = (g 1 + g 2 )=y). The intuition to explain the prediction that …rms perceive public service-related constraints as more binding than public capital-related constraints is that public capital grows over time so that the stock of public capital will typically be larger than the ‡ow of public services (i.e. G 2 > G 1 in Model 2). With decreasing marginal returns and when G 2 > G 1 , it is therefore clear that B ps > B pc . These biases arise because …rms ignore the government budget constraint. In contrast, no speci…c predictions can be made about the relation between two public service-related constraints and two public capital-related constraints. Table 2 shows, for example, that the probability of …rms falsely ranking tax constraints as a greater growth constraint than public service or public capital constraints, is high. At the same time, in the unlikely case that …rms perceive public services or public capital as a greater constraint than the tax rate, the policy implications of the …rms'ranking are likely 'correct'(i.e. growth-enhancing).
Firms' Ranking of Constraints: Empirical Observations
This section compares the theoretical predictions of how …rms rank …scal policy-related constraints with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to identify the extent to which these data contain information of use to policy makers. This allows us to assess whether the systematic bias in the ranking of growth constraints by the same …rm appears to be present in the data. The WBES dataset we use is based on cross-section, …rm-level data that covers almost 94,000 …rms in 148 countries that rate at least one of the relevant constraints.
Each of the countries included in the dataset was surveyed up to …ve times between 2002 and 2010 giving a total of 235 di¤erent surveys. 17 The Enterprise Surveys provide a potentially useful testing ground against which the model predictions with respect to the behavior of private agents can be compared. The data includes a subjective rating of di¤erent …scal policyrelated constraints: …rm representatives were presented a list of obstacles which they had to evaluate on a scale that ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). Some of the items in the list of obstacles are closely related to …scal policy. They include transportation, skills and education of 17 The data was downloaded from www.enterprisesurveys.org on July 30th 2010. 25 available workers, crime, theft and disorder, tax rates, and, to a lesser extent, tax administration. Governments undertake public investment to built up transportation infrastructure. 18 Recurrent public spending to provide public services in the education sector determines to a considerable extent the skills and the education level of available workers 19 , and law enforcement by public agencies (which likewise requires especially recurrent spending and only to a lesser extent public investment) determines crime rates. The quality of the tax administration depends to some extent on recurrent public spending, but other factors are also likely to play an important role. In the models, transportation infrastructure which requires relatively little recurrent spending and depreciates very slowly is represented by public capital. Education services, law enforcement and to a lesser extent tax administration may be represented by public services which both require a large share of recurrent public spending. However, the WBES does not contain actual information on deviations of …scal policy from the growth-maximizing level of taxation, public services and public capital. We turn to this issue at the end of this section.
In general, there are several di¢ culties involved in the use of subjective data including the reference point bias (i.e. respondents may use di¤erent benchmarks against which obstacles are assessed), di¤erences in the overall tendencies to complain, and the performance bias (i.e. whether ratings actually re ‡ect the …rm's performance in the environment rather than the environment in which it operates) (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2009) and Clarke (2010)). We address these concerns by converting the subjective rating of constraints into a ranking: the rating of the obstacles of every …rm is divided by the mean rating of all obstacles by the same …rm.
The means of these ratios across all …rms and countries are displayed in 18 While in some countries, the government builds up electricity generation capacity using public revenue, the role of the government is typically more that of a regulator, and whether electricity is a major obstacle is to a larger extent determined by exogenous shocks such as droughts than in the cases of the other obstacles. We therefore do not consider electricity generation capacity as a …scal-policy related obstacle. 19 We assume that the evaluation of the skills of available workers includes an implicit evaluation of public education services. Figure 2 . As anticipated by the model it shows that transport is ranked lower than constraints that require a relatively high share of recurrent spending in order to be alleviated (education, crime and tax administration) which in turn are ranked lower than tax rates. Note also that the three public service categories are rated similarly. While the mean rankings suggest that taxation is usually ranked as the most severe obstacle to growth of the six considered, of greater interest is the distribution of mean rankings across countries. Figure 3 compares the average ranking of the …ve …scal policy-dependent constraints (transportation, crime, education, tax administration and tax rates). It shows that in almost 60 percent of the countries, tax rates are ranked …rst, and in over 50 percent 27 of the countries, transport is ranked last. 20 In contrast, there are only a few surveys where tax rates are among the three least important obstacles, and transportation is rarely ranked among the …rst three obstacles. It can also be seen that, as we would predict, there is no clear rank order between the public service-related constraints: education, crime and tax administration. the most severe obstacle in most countries. Based on the endogenous growth models considered above we anticipated that the tax-related constraint would be perceived as more binding than the public service-related constraints (crime and disorder, education and skills), which, in turn, would be perceived as more binding than public capital-related constraints (transportation). Figures 2 and 3 show that on average, the observed patterns follow these predictions, and it is likely that these patterns are not mainly driven by actual …scal policies but rather by a bias in the perception of …rms. For these observations the model suggests that there is little reliable information for policy makers. There are however a su¢ ciently large number of occasions in which …scal constraints are not in that order to suggest that there is some information within the data. At the simplest level there are for example 40 percent of countries in which taxation is not ranked as the most severe constraint. Indeed there are 104 occasions out of 235 in which one of the remaining …ve …scal constraints is rated as more severe than taxation. Or focusing on transportation which is closely related to the stock of public capital, there are 120 occasions out of 235 when this is not ranked as the least important obstacle on growth. The model also suggests that the rankings across di¤erent types of public service or di¤erent types of public capital are informative. Given that we are only able to assess the …rms' ranking based on the model predictions but not based on objective data on deviations of actual …scal policy parameters from their growth-maximizing values, we cannot fully rule out that the observed average ranking pattern is driven by the actual severity of constraints. However, this seems unrealistic: on the one hand, if one assumes for simplicity and in the absence of other information that the severity of constraints is equally distributed across constraints (i.e. that on average, the severity of each constraint is identical), such a ranking would not emerge. On the other hand, many policy documents, for instance by international development banks, routinely identify infrastructure as a bottleneck to economic growth, or recommend increasing infrastructure investment. Assuming that on average, this analysis is correct, …rms should perceive transport infrastructure as a much more severe constraint if their views were unbiased. However, this is not the case, which makes us con…dent that our model-based conclusions are correct.
Conclusions
This paper has modelled business perceptions of alternative …scal policyrelated growth constraints using an endogenous growth model with public …nance. It has then considered the merits of these perceptions as guides for policy making in practice, and compared the ranking of constraints by …rms in the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys with the predictions of the model.
The models demonstrate that a 'careful'use of business perceptions of different constraints relative to each other to identify growth-enhancing …scal policy reforms is possible. According to our framework, business perceptions are not useful to infer the optimal level, the optimal composition and the optimal magnitude of policy adjustments. However, it is the direction of the policy change which is often most important for policy in practice due to budget rigidities. In this case, business perceptions can provide some useful information. The models examined suggest that …rms may be expected to be better at distinguishing the growth-enhancing or retarding e¤ects of similar public spending categories (di¤erent public services or di¤erent types of public capital). However, the models demonstrate that business perceptions may be misleading when …rms are asked to compare taxes, public services and public capital with each other in the sense that there is no certainty that the …scal policy prescriptions they imply are growth-enhancing in the long run. One exception is that the policy implications from the comparison of di¤erent aspects of …scal policy are likely to be growth-enhancing when they are ranked contrary to the general prediction that taxes are ranked as a more severe constraint than public expenditures, and that public services are likely to be ranked as more severe than public capital.
The theoretical predictions regarding how …rms are most likely to rank …scal policy-related constraints correspond fairly well to empirical observations. While we do not observe the actual ranking of constraints and are therefore unable to compare this to the perceived ranking, we argue that it is likely that the overall pattern we observe is driven by the biases we identify in our models. When constraints are ranked according to the predictions of the model, business perceptions are not reliable for policy analysis. However there are a su¢ ciently large number of observations for which the model suggests that business perceptions are a useful guide. Therefore, this has been a worthwhile exercise, and our analysis does not suggest that business perceptions never contain useful information.
The results of this paper may also help to interpret …ndings of empiri-30 cal papers that use business perception data as explanatory variables. For instance, Balchin and Edwards (2008) …nd that business perceptions of infrastructure are mostly not a signi…cant determinants of export participation even though they …nd that objective infrastructure indicators are to some extent signi…cant. The results of this paper suggest that these …ndings are not surprising because on average and in comparisons to other constraints, …rms do not perceive infrastructure as an important obstacle irrespective of the actual state of the infrastructure. The results here also suggest possible options for the re-design of investment climate surveys. In particular, they suggest that the …rms'ranking of tax-related constraints may be exaggerated. In addition, they suggest that it would be useful to ask …rms to compare di¤erent types of public capital, and, in a separate question, to ask …rms to compare di¤erent types of public services. This would provide …rms with a more re…ned list of obstacles, and make their resulting comparisons more meaningful.
Our results only hold within the standard modelling framework we use and the assumptions it is based on. One implication of this framework is that …rms in fact do not learn from past mistakes and revise their perceptions accordingly. This is likely to correspond to …rm behavior in practice because this would require …rms to systematically record their perceptions and …scal policy changes and compare them to their own growth and investment behavior. However, …rms are unlikely to do this because learning would entail cost but no bene…ts in terms of better …rm performance.
While we recognize that alternative frameworks to interpret business perceptions data may be available, we believe our results suggest that endogenous growth models with public …nance are a natural 'framework'to provide …rst steps to understand the value of perception data. Establishing the robustness of those conclusions to alternative frameworks is an obvious next step. The models examined here, and compared with business perceptions, are limited to relatively simple public service/capital distinctions and the channels by which they impact on growth. Possible extensions could for instance include adding further channels that a¤ect the growth-maximizing …scal policy.
31
We have shown that business perceptions in absolute terms do not contain useful information for governments. However, we have compared the rating of di¤erent constraints by a single …rm and have shown that such a ranking may be useful for governments. Future research could therefore usefully discuss other types of comparisons. For instance, our framework could be used to compare the rating of the same constraint across …rms in di¤erent sectors or countries more in the spirit of Carlin et al. (2010) . This would require models with at least two sectors of production that are a¤ected by productive public services as in Monteiro and Turnovsky (2008) . A …nal extension would be to include other types of business perceptions in the discussion which would require a more complex modelling framework. where F is a function. From (8) and (23), 
